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Abstract
Section 162 of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 empowers courts to
declare directors delinquent and hence to disqualify them from office. This article
compares the judicial disqualification of directors under this section with the equiva-
lent provisions in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States of America,
which have all influenced the South African act. The article compares the classes of
persons who have locus standi to apply to court to disqualify a director from holding
office, as well as the grounds for the judicial disqualification of a director, the dur-
ation of the disqualification, the application of a prescription period and the discre-
tion conferred on courts to disqualify directors from office. It contends that, in
empowering courts to disqualify directors from holding office, section 162 of the
South African Companies Act goes too far in certain respects.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
A significant innovation in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the SA Companies
Act), which came into force on 1 May 2011, is section 162, which empowers a
court to make an order declaring a director to be delinquent on various
grounds. The effect of a delinquency order is that the director in question is
disqualified and prohibited from holding office as a director of any company.1
There is no need for a court specifically to order the removal of a delinquent
person from office because of the “automatic inherent effect of such a
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1 SA Companies Act, sec 69(8)(a). See also Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others 2013 (5) SA 315
(GSJ), para 20; Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC), para 159;
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC), para 5.
Journal of African Law, 65, 1 (2021), 87–110 © SOAS University of London, 2020
doi:10.1017/S0021855320000248 First published online 9 November 2020

Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855320000248
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNISA University of South Africa Library, on 04 Mar 2021 at 11:48:48, subject to the Cambridge
declaration”.2 A delinquency order may subsist for the lifetime of the director
or for seven years or longer, as determined by the court.3
The removal of a director by a court under section 162 must be distin-
guished from the internal removal of a director by shareholders under section
71(1) of the SA Companies Act by means of an ordinary resolution, or the
removal of a director by the board of directors under section 71(3) by
means of a board resolution.4 The disqualification of a director by a court
under section 162 requires an application to court, by a party with the neces-
sary standing, for an order to declare a director delinquent. Should a director
be removed from office by the shareholders or by the board under section 71,
his or her removal would be specific to that particular company, but a dis-
qualification by a court under section 162 would disqualify the director
from participating in the management of any company.5 A further distinction
must be made between the automatic grounds for disqualification, as set out
in section 69 of the act, which do not require an order of court,6 and applica-
tions to court under section 162 to disqualify directors from office. The focus
of this article is on the disqualification of directors following a court applica-
tion under section 162 of the SA Companies Act,7 and not on the internal
removal of directors by the shareholders or the board, nor on the automatic
disqualification of directors.
It is noteworthy that section 5(1) of the SA Companies Act requires the act to
be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to its purposes in sec-
tion 7. One particular purpose, contained in section 7(i), is to balance the
rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies.
Other relevant purposes are to: promote the development of the South
African economy by encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency;8
encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies;9 and
2 Kukama v Lobelo 2012 JDR 0062 (GSJ), para 22; Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and
Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ), para 32.
3 SA Companies Act, sec 162(6).
4 Sec 71(3) permits the board of directors to remove a director from office in certain
defined instances.
5 JJ du Plessis and JN de Koker “Analyses, perspectives and jurisdictional overview” in JJ du
Plessis and JN de Koker (eds) Disqualification of Company Directors: A Comparative Analysis of
the Law in the UK, Australia, South Africa, the US and Germany (2007, Routledge) 1 at 5.
6 If a director falls under any of the grounds of ineligibility or disqualification set out in
sec 69 during his or her term of office, he or she would automatically cease to be entitled
to continue to act as a company director.
7 It is noteworthy that, under sec 162(7) of the SA Companies Act, a court may also make
an order placing a person under probation. The maximum period for which a probation
order subsists is five years. A person under a probation order may still act as a director,
but only to the extent permitted by the order. Since a probation order does not neces-
sarily disqualify a person from acting as a director, this article is confined to an analysis
of delinquency orders.
8 SA Companies Act, sec 7(b)(i).
9 Id, sec 7(j).
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provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of
companies.10 As stated in Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker,11 effect must be
given to these purposes when interpreting and applying section 162.
Section 5(2) of the SA Companies Act provides that, to the extent appropri-
ate, a court interpreting or applying the act may consider foreign law. In
Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd,12 the High
Court observed that company law in South Africa has for many decades
tracked the English system and has taken its lead from the relevant English
Companies Act and jurisprudence, but that section 5(2) now encourages
South African courts to look further afield in interpreting the act, and to
have regard in appropriate circumstances to other corporate law jurisdictions,
be they American, European, Asian or African. Notably, courts in the United
Kingdom (UK), Australia and the United States of America (USA) are also
empowered to disqualify directors from holding office. The corporate legisla-
tion of these jurisdictions has strongly influenced the SA Companies Act.
Consequently, and as buttressed by section 5(2), this article compares the judi-
cial disqualification of directors from office under section 162 of the SA
Companies Act with the equivalent provisions in the UK, Australia and the
USA. The relevant provisions of the Company Directors Disqualification Act
1986 (the CDDA), which regulates the disqualification of directors in the UK,
are examined for the reason that South African company law is historically
based on the English company law system. Relevant provisions of the
Australian Corporations Act of 2001 (Australian Corporations Act), which is
also historically based on UK company law, are also reviewed in order to ascer-
tain whether any useful and relevant guidelines may be gleaned.13 It is also bene-
ficial and informative to investigate the scope of the judicial power to remove
directors from office under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 1984
of the USA (MBCA) and under the corporate legislation of certain US states.14
10 Id, sec 7(l).
11 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC), para 85.
12 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC), para 26.
13 While company law in Australia is historically based on UK company law, present-day
company law in Australia under the Australian Corporations Act is less dependent on
UK company law; see further CM Bruner Corporate Governance in the Common-Law
World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power (2013, Cambridge University Press)
at 66.
14 The USA has a federal system where federal law is enacted by the US Congress while state
law is enacted by individual state legislatures. Each state has its own legal system and
judiciary, which are separate from the federal system. Generally, state law provides for
corporate law matters, which are regulated by the 50 states. This article deals with the
judicial removal of directors under state, not federal, law. For a discussion of the judicial
removal of a director of a public company on application by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act 1933, the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, see HM Farhan and JN de Koker “The United States” in du
Plessis and de Koker (eds) Disqualification of Company Directors, above at note 5, 155 at
163–65.
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The locus standi [capacity to bring legal action] to apply to court to disqualify
a director from holding office is compared, as are the grounds for the judicial
disqualification of a director, the duration of the removal, the prescription
period to initiate court proceedings and the discretion conferred on courts
to disqualify directors from holding office. The article contends that section
162 of the SA Companies Act is, in certain respects, wider, stricter and more
far-reaching than the equivalent provisions in the UK, Australia and the
USA, and that it goes too far in certain respects in empowering courts to dis-
qualify directors from office. Drawing on the equivalent provisions in the UK,
Australia and the USA, the article recommends modifications to section 162
with a view to improving the regulation of the judicial disqualification of
directors under South African law, and to serve the statutory purposes of
the act better.
PURPOSE OF SECTION 162
The innovation in section 162 of the SA Companies Act lies in the introduction
of a new civil remedy for those harmed by the conduct of delinquent direc-
tors.15 This section does not invoke criminal liability. The assessment of
whether a director is delinquent will therefore be determined on a civil stand-
ard of proof and on the balance of probabilities. Section 162 has an underlying
protective purpose: it is directed at protecting companies and corporate stake-
holders from directors who have proven themselves unable to manage the
business of the company or have failed in, or are in neglect of, their duties
as directors.16 Orders disqualifying directors from acting as such are designed
to maintain high corporate standards and to prevent unlawful and fraudulent
behaviour.17
To the extent that section 162 does not impose a criminal sanction, the pro-
vision is clearly not a penal one. It is, however, submitted that the proceedings
do nonetheless embody a punitive element. As reaffirmed by Browne-
Wilkinson V-C in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd,18 if the court’s power to disqual-
ify a director is exercised, there is inevitably substantial and significant inter-
ference with the individual’s entrepreneurial freedom. It follows that the
individual’s rights must be fully protected.19 In approving this approach, in
Re Crestjoy Products Ltd the Chancery Division observed that, when a court is
faced with a mandatory disqualification period once the facts are proved,
the matter becomes somewhat more penal.20 A further punitive effect of a
15 Grancy v Gihwala, above at note 1, para 155.
16 Msimang v Katuliiba, above at note 2, para 29; Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited
and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA), para 14; Lewis v Woollam, above at note 1, para 40.
17 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129, para 49.
18 [1988] 2 All ER 692 at 696.
19 Ibid. See further Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 14.
20 1990 BCC 23 at 26.
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declaration of delinquency is that it carries a stigma.21 The reputational dam-
age caused by a delinquency order is extensive and is likely to endure for a
long time. In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins and Others, the
UK Court of Appeal acknowledged the penal elements involved in the disquali-
fication of a director.22 Several Australian courts have also recognized that dis-
qualification orders are not purely or entirely protective and that they do
include a penal element.23
INDIRECT REMOVAL POWER
The power conferred on a court to remove a director from office under section
162 of the SA Companies Act is indirect, not direct. This is because a court is
empowered to declare a director delinquent, which has the effect of disquali-
fying the person from being a director. As the High Court declared in Kukama
v Lobelo24 and Msimang v Katuliiba,25 there is no need for a court specifically to
order the removal of a delinquent person from office because of the “auto-
matic inherent effect of such a declaration”.
Thus, under South African company law, one may not apply directly to a
court to remove a director from office; instead, this must be done in the con-
text of a court application to declare a director delinquent. This approach is
modelled on UK and Australian company legislation. In the UK, a disqualifica-
tion order under the CDDA has the effect that a person may not, without leave
of the court, be a director of the company or be concerned in any way or take
part in the promotion, formation or management of a company.26 Likewise,
sections 206C, 206D, 206E and 206EEA of the Australian Corporations Act
(titled “Court power of disqualification”) confer on courts the power to dis-
qualify directors from managing corporations and hence indirectly remove
them from office.
In contrast, section 8.09(a) of the MBCA (titled “Removal of directors by judi-
cial proceeding”) confers on courts the direct power to remove directors from
office, on application by or in the name of the corporation. Most US states have
statutory procedures for the judicial removal of directors and also confer on
courts a direct power to remove directors from office.27
21 Re Westminster Property Management Ltd Official Receiver v Stern 2001 BCC 121, para 36.
22 [2000] BCC 998 at 1007.
23 See for instance: Rich v ASIC, above at note 17, paras 32, 35 and 50–52; Australian Securities
and Investments Commission v Beekink [2007] FCAFC 7, paras 80–91; Australian Securities and
Investments Commission v Axis International Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2011] FCA 811 (2011),
para 9; Gilfillan and Others v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] NSWCA
370, paras 180–85.
24 Above at note 2, para 22.
25 Above at note 2, para 32.
26 CDDA, sec 1.
27 See for example: Arizona Revised Statutes, sec 10-809(A); California Corporations Code,
sec 304; Connecticut General Statutes, sec 33-743(a); Pennsylvania Business Corporation
Law, sec 1726(c); and Washington Business Corporation Act, sec 23B.08.090(1).
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LOCUS STANDI TO APPLY TO COURT TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR
Section 162 of the SA Companies Act gives a very wide range of persons locus
standi to apply to court to declare a director delinquent: a company; a share-
holder; a director; the company secretary; a prescribed officer of a company;
a registered trade union that represents employees of the company or another
employee representative; the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission
(CIPC) (South Africa’s corporate regulator); the Takeover Regulation Panel; and
any organ of state responsible for the administration of legislation.28 The
equivalent provisions in the CDDA, the Australian Corporations Act, the
MBCA and the corporate legislation of relevant US states do not confer such
locus standi on the company secretary, trade union or employee representative,
whose position is unique to South African corporate law. There is much
potential for a trade union or another employee representative to put direc-
tors under pressure by exercising or threatening to exercise such rights.29
Section 162 confers legal standing on shareholders and other stakeholders,
even though the directors’ misconduct may not infringe their rights and irre-
spective of whether the directors’ duties are owed directly to them.30 Even a
single shareholder or a single director may bring an application under section
162 to declare a director delinquent, thus conferring considerable power on
that person.
The CDDA confers locus standi on the secretary of state (or the official
receiver acting under the direction of the secretary of state) to apply to
court for an order disqualifying unfit directors.31 Under section 9A(10) of
the CDDA, the Competition and Markets Authority and a “specified regulator”
have standing to apply to court for a disqualification order in the case of com-
petition infringements. Under section 9E(2), “specified regulators” are the
Office of Communications, the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, the
Water Services Regulation Authority, the Office of Rail and Road, the Civil
Aviation Authority, Monitor, the Payment Systems Regulator and the
Financial Conduct Authority. An application for a disqualification order for
general misconduct in connection with companies may be made by the secre-
tary of state, the official receiver of a company being wound-up, the liquidator,
or any past or present members or creditors of a company or overseas com-
pany in relation to which the person concerned has committed an offence
or other default.32 Under section 5A of the CDDA, the secretary of state may
also apply to court for a disqualification order against a person who has
28 SA Companies Act, secs 162(2), (3) and (4).
29 J du Plessis and P Delport “‘Delinquent directors’ and ‘directors under probation’: A
unique South African approach regarding disqualification of company directors”
(2017) 134/2 South African Law Journal 274 at 277.
30 Id at 293.
31 CDDA, secs 6, 7(1)(b) and 8.
32 Id, sec 16(2).
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been convicted of a relevant foreign offence.33 When a court makes a declar-
ation under section 213 (fraudulent trading) or section 214 (wrongful trading)
of the Insolvency Act 1986 to the effect that a person is liable to make a con-
tribution to a company’s assets, then (regardless of who applied for the declar-
ation) the court may, if it thinks fit, also make a disqualification order against
that person.34
In certain respects, the persons who have been conferred locus standi under
the CDDA are more extensive than those in section 162 of the SA Companies
Act. For instance, section 162 does not permit a liquidator, creditor or speci-
fied regulator to apply for a court order disqualifying a director. In the case
of a disqualification for fraudulent trading or wrongful trading under section
10(1) of the CDDA it appears, in a sweeping provision, that “any person” may
apply to court for a disqualification order against the miscreant director.
These words indicate that very wide standing has been conferred under this
particular ground for disqualification. In other respects, however, section
162 of the SA Companies Act empowers a wider group of persons to apply
to court to disqualify a director from holding office compared to the CDDA.
For instance, the CDDA does not explicitly empower a director to apply to
court to disqualify another director from office. A director may nevertheless
have locus standi under section 10(1) of the CDDA (relying on the words “any
person”), but this would be limited to instances of fraudulent and wrongful
trading. While a shareholder has been conferred locus standi under section
162(2) of the SA Companies Act, under the CDDA a shareholder may only in
limited instances institute an application to disqualify a director.35
The contrast between the persons who have locus standi to apply to court to
disqualify a director and hence remove him or her from office under the
Australian Corporations Act compared to the SA Companies Act is much
more striking. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC),
Australia’s corporate regulator, is the only body that may apply to court to dis-
qualify a director from holding office.36 Neither a shareholder nor a director
has such locus standi. A limitation of this approach is that less serious contra-
ventions might by overlooked by ASIC since the pursuit of such offences
might not have as much of a deterrent effect as the pursuit of more serious
33 This is an offence committed outside Great Britain in connection with the “promotion,
formation, management, liquidation or striking-off of a company (or any similar proced-
ure)” or “a person being an administrative receiver of a company (or holding a similar
position)” and “which corresponds to an indictable offence under the law of England
and Wales” or Scotland: CDDA, sec 5A(3).
34 Id, sec 10(1).
35 These instances are: disqualification on conviction of an indictable offence in connec-
tion with the promotion, formation, management, liquidation or striking-off of a com-
pany; disqualification for persistent breaches of company legislation; and
disqualification for fraud in the winding-up of a company: id, secs 2, 3, 4 and 16(2).
36 Australian Corporations Act, part 2D.6.
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contraventions that would probably result in long periods of disqualification
for miscreant directors.37
As is the position under the Australian Corporations Act, under the MBCA
and the corporate legislation of various relevant US states, a single shareholder
and a single director do not enjoy locus standi to apply to court to remove a
director. Under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA and section 225(c) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL),38 the board of directors or a
shareholder suing derivatively in the name of the company has locus standi
to apply to court to “remove a director from office”. The corporate legislation
of several US states requires shareholders holding at least ten per cent of the
outstanding shares to institute a court application to remove a director
from office.39 South Carolina requires five per cent of the outstanding shares
to be held by a shareholder in order to bring an action to remove a director
from office.40 Only one US state, Pennsylvania, permits a single shareholder
to institute an action to remove a director from office: section 1726(d) of the
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law provides that “any” shareholder or dir-
ector may apply to court to remove a director from office. The company must
nevertheless be a party to the application and the shareholder must comply
with the requirements relating to derivative actions.
In the controversial South African case of Lewis Group Limited v Woollam
(Lewis v Woollam),41 Woollam, a minority shareholder of Lewis Group
Limited, instituted proceedings to declare delinquent the company’s chief
executive officer, chief financial officer, chairperson of the board and chair-
person of the audit and risk committee. Lewis Group Limited is a public com-
pany listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with over 700 retail outlets
in South Africa. Woollam instituted the proceedings to declare the directors
delinquent using the derivative action remedy.42 The High Court held that a
shareholder may not use the derivative action to declare a director delinquent,
37 T Blackie and JJ du Plessis “Australia” in du Plessis and de Koker (eds) Disqualification of
Company Directors, above at note 5, 69 at 101.
38 Delaware Code, title 8, chap 1.
39 See, for example: California Corporations Code, sec 304; Washington Business
Corporation Act, sec 23B.08.090(1); New York Business Corporation Law, sec 706(d);
and Rhode Island Business Corporation Act, sec 7-1.2-805(d). Under the latter two sta-
tutes, the attorney general may also apply to court to remove a director from office.
40 South Carolina Code of Laws, sec 33-8-109(a).
41 Above at note 1.
42 A derivative action relates to proceedings instituted by persons given standing to litigate
in their own names for and behalf of a corporation in respect of wrongs done to the cor-
poration (see SA Companies Act, sec 165 and Lewis v Woollam, id, para 27). A derivative
action is brought by an applicant on behalf of a company in order to protect the com-
pany’s legal interests. Where a wrong is done to the company, the “proper plaintiff” is
the company itself and not the shareholders; see Foss v Harbottle (1983) 2 Hare 461, 67
ER 189 and MF Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for
Judicial Discretion (2016, Juta) at 5–8. Therefore, the derivative action is an exception to
the “proper plaintiff” rule.
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and that this action must be brought personally by a shareholder, in his or her
own name. After investigating the preliminary procedures under section 165
of the SA Companies Act with regard to derivative proceedings, the court held
that these procedures are not well suited to derivative proceedings by share-
holders to declare directors delinquent.43 The court accordingly ruled that
“it is not within the scheme” of the SA Companies Act that shareholders
should ordinarily seek to proceed derivatively to obtain a delinquency order
under section 162.44
In sharp contrast, both the MBCA and the DGCL make explicit provision for
derivative action proceedings to be instituted by a shareholder to remove a dir-
ector from office. Under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA, a court may “remove a
director from office” in proceedings commenced “by or in the right of the cor-
poration”. The proceedings must be brought by the board of directors, or by a
shareholder, who must sue derivatively. Section 8.09(b) of the MBCA states that
a shareholder proceeding on behalf of the corporation under section 8.09(a)
must comply with the requirements of subchapter 7D of the MBCA, dealing
with derivative actions. Likewise, section 225(c) of the DGCL states that judicial
removal proceedings must be instituted “upon application by the corporation,
or derivatively in the right of the corporation by any stockholder”. Some other
US states that also require judicial removal proceedings of a director to be
commenced derivatively in the name of the company by the shareholders
are Connecticut,45 the District of Columbia,46 Idaho,47 South Dakota48 and
Pennsylvania.49 Comparatively, section 162(2) of the SA Companies Act is
wider than the MBCA, the DGCL and the corporate legislation of several rele-
vant US states in that it not only permits a single shareholder to commence
judicial disqualification proceedings under section 162 but, according to
Lewis v Woollam,50 such proceedings may not be commenced derivatively by
the shareholder but must be commenced in the shareholder’s own name.
In light of the extensive range of persons who are empowered to apply to
court to disqualify a director from holding office under section 162(2) of the
SA Companies Act, it becomes important to guard against abuse of the section.
This is because frivolous and vexatious applications may be lodged by persons
with locus standi. Such applications may result in harm to the company and to
the reputation of its directors. This is especially important with regard to a
43 Lewis v Woollam, id, paras 45–49.
44 Id, para 49. For a critique of this judgment, see R Cassim “The launching of delinquency
proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by means of the derivative action: Lewis
Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)” (2017) 38/3 Obiter 673.
45 Connecticut General Statutes, secs 33-743(a) and (b).
46 District of Columbia Code, sec 29-306.09(a).
47 Idaho Code, sec 30-29-809(2).
48 South Dakota Business Corporation Act, sec 47-1A-809.
49 Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, sec 1726(c).
50 Above at note 1.
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listed public company, where the value of the company’s shares could easily
be affected by the mere lodging of an application under section 162.
This is precisely what occurred in Lewis v Woollam. Lewis Group Limited
argued that, in instituting proceedings to have four directors of the company
declared delinquent, Woollam had not acted in good faith and that his appli-
cation was vexatious. The company contended that Woollam was involved in
market manipulation, namely short-selling activities, and that his conduct in
instituting delinquency proceedings was aimed at driving down the com-
pany’s share price in order to benefit his activities.51 The negative publicity
as a result of the delinquency proceedings did in fact have an adverse effect
on the company’s share price.52 While the court noted that Woollam had
failed to disclose his short-selling activities and that this had raised an ethical
question,53 it did not decide whether Woollam had acted in bad faith as the
matter had already been referred by the company to the Financial Sector
Conduct Authority for investigation. Due to insufficient evidence, this body
subsequently cleared Woollam of any wrongdoing.54
This case illustrates the extent of the power conferred on a single share-
holder to institute proceedings to declare a director delinquent. Section 162
of the SA Companies Act does not contain safeguards against vexatious or friv-
olous applications. It is submitted that, if a shareholder were to institute pro-
ceedings derivatively to declare a director delinquent, this would have the
advantage of expeditiously curbing any abuse of section 162, since a court
would be able to screen out at a preliminary stage legal proceedings instituted
with an ulterior motive. The damage done to Lewis Group Limited’s share
price and to the reputation of the directors could have been more extensive
had the application been instituted by Woollam personally, and had the direc-
tors been involved in a protracted legal battle in terms of section 162.
THE GROUNDS FOR THE JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION OF A
DIRECTOR
Section 162(5) of the SA Companies Act lists the specific grounds on which a
person with locus standi may rely to apply to court to declare a director
51 Id, para 86.
52 Ibid.
53 Id, para 87.
54 “Report by the Directorate of Market Abuse” (Financial Services Board press release, 28
September 2016), available at: <http://www.fsca.co.za/News%20Documents/2016-09-
28%20(2).pdf> (last accessed 30 September 2020); C Smith “Consumer watchdog cleared
of Lewis allegations” (30 September 2016) fin24, available at: <http://www.fin24.com/
Companies/Retail/consumer-watchdog-cleared-of-lewis-allegations-20160930> (last accessed
30 September 2020); S Cassidy “Woollam shrugs off ‘dirty tricks and lies’ in Lewis fight”
(30 September 2016) IOL, available at: <http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/
woollam-shrugs-off-dirty-tricks-and-lies-in-lewis-fight-2074840> (last accessed 30 September
2020).
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delinquent. These grounds constitute a substantive abuse of office and such
conduct evinces a lack of genuine concern for the company’s prosperity.55
For a person to succeed in obtaining a declaration of delinquency, very serious
misconduct must be demonstrated by the director concerned.56 Establishing
so-called “ordinary” negligence, poor business decision-making or misguided
reliance on incorrect professional advice is insufficient.57 Likewise, in Re
Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd58 the court found that ordinary commercial mis-
judgment is not in itself sufficient to justify disqualification and that the con-
duct complained of must display a lack of commercial probity.
Under section 162(5), a court must grant an order declaring a director to be
delinquent if the person: (i) consented to serve as a director, or acted in the
capacity of a director, while ineligible or disqualified to be a director; (ii)
while under an order of probation, acted as a director in a manner that contra-
vened that order; (iii) while a director, grossly abused the position of a dir-
ector; (iv) while a director, took personal advantage of information or an
opportunity, or intentionally or by gross negligence inflicted harm upon
the company or its subsidiary; (v) while a director, acted in a manner that
amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust, or in a
manner contemplated in sections 77(3)(a), (b) or (c) of the SA Companies Act
(unauthorized acts, reckless trading or fraud); (vi) has repeatedly been subject
to a compliance notice or similar enforcement mechanism, for substantially
similar conduct, under any legislation; (vii) has at least twice been personally
convicted of an offence or subjected to an administrative fine or penalty under
any legislation; or (viii) within a period of five years, was a director of one or
more companies or controlled or participated in the control of a juristic per-
son, irrespective of whether concurrently, sequentially or at unrelated times,
that was convicted of an offence or subjected to an administrative fine or simi-
lar penalty under any legislation.59
55 Grancy v Gihwala, above at note 1, paras 156 and 176;Westerhuis v Whittaker 2018 JDR 0825
(WCC), para 38.
56 Lewis v Woollam, above at note 1, para 18.
57 Ibid.
58 Above at note 18 at 696.
59 Only the CIPC, the Takeover Regulation Panel and an organ of state may rely on the
grounds listed in (vi), (vii) and (viii) above: SA Companies Act, secs 162(3)(b)(i) and 162
(4)(b). For case examples of the application of the grounds of delinquency, see: Kukama
v Lobelo, above at note 2; Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ); Msimang v Katuliiba,
above at note 2; Rabinowitz v Van Graan, above at note 1; Cape Empowerment v Druker,
above at note 11; Demetriades and Another v Tollie and Others (1995/2014) [2015] ZANCHC
17 (18 September 2015); Gihwala v Grancy, above at note 16; Lewis v Woollam, above at
note 1; and Companies and Intellectual Property Commission v Cresswell and Others
(21092/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 38 (27 March 2017). For discussion of the grounds of delin-
quency, see further: R Cassim “Governance and the board of directors” in FHI Cassim (ed)
Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012, Juta) 400 at 436–37; and R Cassim The Removal of
Directors and Delinquency Orders under the South African Companies Act (2020, Juta) at 257–75.
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In some respects, the grounds to declare a director delinquent and hence to
disqualify him or her from holding office are wider and more far-reaching
under section 162 of the SA Companies Act, compared to the equivalent provi-
sions in the UK, Australia and the USA, but in other respects they are narrower.
For instance, under section 162(5)(c)(iii) of the SA Companies Act, a director
may be judicially disqualified from office if he or she intentionally or by
gross negligence inflicted harm on the company. Section 8.09(a) of the
MBCA and the corporate legislation of some US states contain an equivalent
ground for the judicial disqualification of directors, under which a court
may remove a director from office if the director had “intentionally inflicted
harm on the corporation”.60 The threshold of misconduct is, however, set
higher in the MBCA and the legislation of these US states in that, unlike sec-
tion 162(5)(c)(iii), gross negligence does not suffice for a court to remove a dir-
ector from office. Moreover, under these US provisions it must be shown that
the director inflicted harm upon the company itself, while section 162(5)(c)(iii)
extends this ground to the infliction of harm on a subsidiary of the company.
Under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA and the corporate legislation of some US
states,61 for a director to be judicially removed from office there must have
been some fraudulent conduct by him or her with respect to the company
or its shareholders. This ground is again narrower than the equivalent ground
in section 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) of the SA Companies Act. Under the latter provision,
read with section 77(3)(c) of the SA Companies Act, for a director to be judi-
cially disqualified from office, the fraudulent conduct in question may extend
not only to a shareholder of the company, but also to a creditor or employee
of the company. Even if the fraudulent conduct does not so extend, it would
nevertheless suffice as long as the conduct had some fraudulent purpose.
Under section 162(5)(c)(i) of the SA Companies Act, a director may be
declared delinquent if he or she has grossly abused the position of director.
The inclusion of the ground of “gross abuse of the position of director”
appears to have been influenced by the corresponding section 8.09(a) of the
MBCA.62 Other US states that have adopted this ground include
Connecticut,63 the District of Columbia64 and South Dakota.65 However, sec-
tion 162(5) of the SA Companies Act goes further than the equivalent provision
in the legislation of some US states. For instance, section 8.35(b) of the Business
Corporation Act of 1983 of Illinois requires the gross abuse of the position of
60 See, for example: Connecticut General Statutes, sec 33-743(a); District of Columbia Code,
sec 29-306.09(a)(1); and South Dakota Business Corporation Act, sec 47-1A-809.
61 See, for example: Connecticut General Statutes, sec 33-743(a); Washington Business
Corporation Act, sec 23B.08.090(1); and California Corporations Code, sec 304.
62 The MBCA, sec 8.09(a) states that a court may remove a director from office in proceed-
ings commenced by or in the name of the company if the court finds that the director
“grossly abused the position of director”.
63 Connecticut General Statutes, sec 33-743(a).
64 District of Columbia Code, sec 29-306.09(a)(1).
65 South Dakota Business Corporation Act, sec 47-1A-809.
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director to have been “to the detriment of the corporation”. In contrast, under
section 162(5) of the SA Companies Act it is irrelevant whether the director’s
gross abuse was to the detriment of the company.
The CDDA provides for a variety of grounds on which a court may make a
disqualification order,66 including: committing an indictable offence in con-
nection with the promotion, formation, management, liquidation or striking
off of a company with the receivership of a company’s property or through
being an administrative receiver of a company;67 persistent breaches of com-
pany legislation;68 fraud in the course of the winding-up of a company;69 dis-
qualification on summary conviction;70 disqualification for relevant foreign
offences;71 specific breaches of competition law;72 fraudulent and wrongful
trading;73 and conduct that makes the director unfit to be concerned in the
management of the company.74 In contrast section 162(5) of the SA
Companies Act does not list all of these grounds of disqualification as a
basis to declare a director delinquent. For instance, no provision is made for
a breach of competition law or a conviction of a foreign offence. In this
respect, section 162(5) of the SA Companies Act is narrower than the CDDA.
In practice, most disqualification orders in the UK are made under section 6
of the CDDA.75 Under this provision a court must make a disqualification
order against a person if it is satisfied that he is or has been a director of a com-
pany that has at any time become insolvent, whether while he was a director
or subsequently, and that his conduct as a director of that company makes
him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. An additional
much wider ground under which a director may be declared to be “unfit”
under the CDDA is contained in section 8(1), under which the secretary of
state may apply to court for a disqualification order against a person who is
or has been a director of a company if it appears to him that it is expedient
in the public interest that such an order should be made. Unlike section 6
of the CDDA, a disqualification order on the ground of unfitness under
66 Instead of applying to court for a disqualification order, in certain circumstances the sec-
retary of state may accept a disqualification undertaking from a director if it is expedient
to do so in the public interest: CDDA, sec 1A. A disqualification undertaking has the
same effect as a disqualification order made by a court after a court hearing.
67 Id, sec 2.
68 Id, sec 3.
69 Id, sec 4.
70 Id, sec 5.
71 Id, sec 5A.
72 Id, sec 9A.
73 Id, sec 10.
74 Id, secs 6 and 8.
75 A Belcher “What makes a director fit: An analysis of the workings of section 17 of the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986” (2012) 16 The Edinburgh Law Review 386
at 388; PL Davies and S Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed,
2016, Sweet & Maxwell) at 249; B Hannigan Company Law (4th ed, 2016, Oxford
University Press) at 175.
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section 8 of the CDDA applies whether or not the company is insolvent.
Schedule 1 of the CDDA sets out a wide range of factors that a court must
take into account in determining whether the director’s conduct makes
him or her unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. These fac-
tors are: the extent to which the person was responsible for the causes of any
material contravention by a company or overseas company of any applicable
legislative or other requirement; the extent to which the person was respon-
sible for the causes of a company or overseas company becoming insolvent;
the frequency of such conduct; and the nature and extent of any loss or
harm caused, or potential loss or harm that could have been caused.76
These factors are however not exhaustive and a court is entitled to take into
account any misconduct that may show unfitness.77 This considerably broad-
ens the grounds of disqualification of a director under the CDDA compared to
the grounds of delinquency under section 162 of the SA Companies Act.78
In certain respects, section 162 of the SA Companies Act is broader than sec-
tions 206C, 206D, 206E and 206EEA of the Australian Corporations Act, while
in other respects it is narrower. For instance, under section 206C of the
Australian Corporations Act a court may disqualify a person from managing
corporations for a period that the court considers appropriate following a dec-
laration under section 1317E that a person has contravened a relevant civil
penalty provision. Civil penalty provisions relate to, inter alia: the fiduciary
duties of company directors, such as the duty to exercise powers and discharge
duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper
purpose; and the duty not to improperly use one’s position as a director or
information obtained in the capacity as a director to gain an advantage for
oneself or someone else, or to cause detriment to the corporation.79 In
these circumstances a court may make a disqualification order if it is satisfied
that the disqualification is justified.80 The grounds listed in section 1317E of
the Australian Corporations Act are very similar to the grounds of delinquency
listed in section 162(5)(c) of the SA Companies Act. In determining whether the
disqualification is justified, section 206C(2)(a) requires a court to have regard
to the “person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or property”
of any corporation. A court may however also take into account any other
76 CDDA, secs 12C(1)(a), 12C(4)(a) and (b) and sched 1.
77 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Lubrani (No 2) [1998] BCC 264 at 268; Re Bath Glass
Ltd (1998) 4 BCC 130 at 132; Re Migration Services International Ltd [2000] BCC 1095 at 1105.
78 A detailed analysis of the ground of unfitness to be a director under the CDDA is beyond
the scope of this article. For further discussion of this topic, see: A Walters “Directors’
duties: The impact of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986” (2000)
21/4 Company Lawyer 110 at 113–19; D Kershaw Company Law in Context (2nd ed, 2012,
Oxford University Press) at 807–10; Davies and Worthington Gower Principles, above at
note 75 at 241–43; Hannigan Company Law, above at note 75 at 379–83.
79 Australian Corporations Act, secs 1317E, 180(1), 181(1), 182(1) and 183(1).
80 Id, sec 206C(1)(b).
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issues that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.81 Thus this ground
for disqualification is more extensive than section 162(5)(c), in that the matters
that may be considered by a court are not restricted to the director’s conduct
in relation to the management of the company.82
Under section 206D of the Australian Corporations Act, a court may disqual-
ify a person from managing corporations if, within the last seven years, the
person had been an officer of two or more corporations that failed and the
court is satisfied that the manner in which the corporation was managed
was wholly or partly responsible for the failure and that the disqualification
is justified. The circumstances when a corporation will be regarded as having
failed relate to its insolvency and winding-up, and to the non-payment of cred-
itors. There is no equivalent provision to section 206D in the SA Companies
Act. Conviction for a foreign offence, referenced in section 206EAA(3) of the
Australian Corporations Act, is also not listed as a ground for delinquency
under the SA Companies Act.83
Section 206E of the Australian Corporations Act empowers ASIC to apply to
court to disqualify a person from managing corporations if the person has at
least twice contravened the act and the court is satisfied that the disqualifica-
tion is justified. Section 162(5)(e) of the SA Companies Act, which provides that
a court must make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent director if
the person has at least twice been personally convicted of an offence or sub-
jected to an administrative fine or penalty under any legislation, is akin to sec-
tion 206E. However, section 206E confines this ground for disqualification to a
contravention of the Australian Corporations Act; it does not extend to a
contravention of any legislation, as is the case under the more far-reaching sec-
tion 162(5)(e). “Legislation” is broadly defined in section 162(1) of the SA
Companies Act.84 This means, for instance, that an organ of state that admin-
isters legislation85 may institute an application to declare a director delin-
quent if the director has twice been subject to an administrative fine under
that legislation, notwithstanding whether the legislation in question has
any connection to the director’s position as a director or to his or her func-
tions as a director. It is submitted that this particular ground for judicial dis-
qualification under the SA Companies Act is unnecessarily wide.
81 Id, sec 206C(2)(b).
82 See RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th
ed, 2018, LexisNexis Butterworths) at 277.
83 This provision empowers ASIC to apply to court to disqualify a director who has been
disqualified under the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Only New Zealand is currently desig-
nated as a prescribed foreign jurisdiction: Corporations Regulations 2001, reg 2D.6.01.
84 For the purposes of sec 162, “legislation” is defined as meaning any national or provincial
legislation: “(a) relating to the promotion, formation or management of a juristic person;
(b) regulating an industry or sector of an industry; or (c) imposing obligations on, prohibit-
ing any conduct by, or otherwise regulating the activities of, a juristic person”.
85 If an organ of state relies on this ground for delinquency, the legislation in question
must be administered by that organ of state.
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Under the SA Companies Act, a declaration of delinquency must be made in
relation to one of the statutory grounds set out in section 162.86 While the
MBCA also limits the grounds for the judicial removal of a director to those
listed in section 8.09(a) of the MBCA, the corporate legislation of certain US
states give courts statutory discretion to rely on grounds for the removal of
a director that are not listed in the applicable legislation. For instance, section
1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, section 706(d) of the
New York Business Corporation Law and section 7-1-2-805 of the Rhode
Island Business Corporation Act state that directors may be removed for
“cause” by a court, without specifying what that cause may be. A court is
given wide discretion to determine whether a particular act of a director con-
stitutes “proper cause”.87 While the statutory grounds for the judicial disquali-
fication of a director under the CDDA are, as discussed above, a closed list, the
factors that a court may take into account in determining the unfitness of a
director and in exercising its discretion whether to disqualify a director, are
not exhaustive. Likewise, as discussed above, in determining whether a dis-
qualification order is justified under the Australian Corporations Act, a
court may have regard to any matters it considers appropriate. It is submitted
that, in light of the fact that South African courts do not have discretion
whether or not to disqualify a director from holding office, unlike courts in
the USA, UK and Australia (as discussed below), it is preferable to have a closed
list of grounds on which a director may be declared delinquent.
DURATION OF REMOVAL
A declaration of delinquency on the ground that a person consented to serve
as a director or acted in the capacity of a director while ineligible or disquali-
fied under section 69 of the SA Companies Act, or acted as a director in a man-
ner that contravened a probation order, is unconditional and subsists for that
person’s lifetime.88 On this basis a court is obliged to disqualify a director
from office for the duration of his or her lifetime under such circumstances,
which, it is submitted, is rather harsh. In all other instances, a declaration of
delinquency subsists for seven years from the date of the court order, or such
longer period as the court determines at the time of making the declaration,
86 Cook: Geoffrey v Hesber Impala (Pty) Ltd and Others (2014/45832) [2016] ZAGPJHC 23 (19
February 2016), paras 60–61.
87 For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase “for cause”, see: Petition of Korff 198 App
Div 553 (1921) at 559; Fox v Cody 141 Misc 552, 252 NYS 395 (Sup Ct 1930) at 554;
Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa 1939) at 48; Campbell v Loew’s Inc 134 A.2d 852
(1957) at 860–61; DMM Bolling “Removal of directors in closely held corporations”
(1959) 12 University of Florida Law Review 234 at 234; KS Ferber Corporation Law (2002,
Prentice Hall) at 40–41; and D Cox and TL Hazen Corporations (2nd ed, 2003, Aspen
Publishers) at 168.
88 SA Companies Act, sec 162(5)(a), (5)(b) and (6)(a).
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subject to any appropriate conditions.89 A South African court has discretion
to extend the duration of the delinquency, but has no discretion to determine
the minimum period of the delinquency or to reduce the prescribed seven-
year period. In Grancy v Gihwala,90 the High Court decided that the purpose
of prescribing minimum periods for a delinquency order is to: remove
unscrupulous directors from office in order to protect investors; ensure
greater consistency in the application of section 162; and ensure that the sec-
tion has a sufficient deterrent effect. In striking contrast, the CDDA, the
Australian Corporations Act, the MBCA and the corporate legislation of rele-
vant US states empower courts to disqualify directors for the period that
they consider appropriate.
The disqualification period under the CDDA varies depending on the
ground for disqualification. In most instances the CDDA does not prescribe
minimum periods of disqualification, as the SA Companies Act does; instead,
it prescribes maximum periods. In respect of disqualification for persistent
breaches of companies legislation and disqualification on summary convic-
tion, the maximum disqualification is for five years.91 However, in other
instances, including the disqualification of a director on a finding of unfitness
under section 8 of the CDDA, the maximum period of disqualification is 15
years.92 It is only with regard to the disqualification of unfit directors of insolv-
ent companies, under section 6 of the CDDA, that both a minimum period of
disqualification (two years) and a maximum period of disqualification (15
years) have been prescribed. Courts in the UK are thus given discretion in
most instances to determine the minimum period of disqualification.93
The Australian Corporations Act confers on courts a high degree of discre-
tion to determine the disqualification period for directors, in that courts are
empowered to disqualify directors for the period that they consider appropri-
ate.94 It is only with regard to disqualification under section 206D, where the
person has been a director of a failed corporation at least twice in seven years,
that a maximum period of 20 years is imposed.95 Some factors that are consid-
ered by Australian courts in exercising their discretion to determine the
appropriate disqualification period are: the specific deterrence of the director
in question; the general deterrence of the penalty; whether the director has a
history of similar breaches; the degree of seriousness of the contraventions;
89 Id, sec 162(6)(b). Some conditions a court may impose are that the director must under-
take a designated programme of remedial education (id, sec 162(10)(a)) or be involved in
a designated programme of community service (id, sec 162(10)(b)).
90 Above at note 1, para 194.
91 CDDA, secs 3(5) and 5(5).
92 Id, sec 8(4).
93 See Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164, CA at 174, where the UK Court of
Appeal set out useful guidelines to determine the appropriate period of disqualification
in instances where the maximum period of disqualification is 15 years.
94 Australian Corporations Act, secs 206C(1), 206E(1) and 206EAA(1).
95 Id, sec 206D(1).
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whether dishonest conduct is involved (which attracts a longer disqualifica-
tion period); the remorse shown by the director; the need to balance the per-
sonal hardship to the director against the public interest; and the likelihood of
the director reforming his or her ways (which is regarded as a mitigating
factor).96
In a similar vein, section 8.09(a) of the MBCA and the corporate legislation of
relevant US states confer discretion on courts to bar the director concerned
from re-election for a period prescribed by the court.97 Section 10-809(b) of
the Arizona Revised Statutes differs from this trend by imposing a maximum
period of five years for which a court may bar a director from re-election, but
it does not lay down a minimum period in this regard.
Section 162 of the SA Companies Act is patently much stricter than the
equivalent legislation in the foreign jurisdictions reviewed here, in that
South African courts have no discretion to deviate from the prescribed min-
imum period of delinquency. The SA Companies Act does, however, offer
some relief for directors to apply to court after three years for the suspension
of the delinquency order and its substitution with a probation order, and,
more than two years thereafter, to have the suspended delinquency order
set aside.98 The implication of section 162(11) of the SA Companies Act is
that the minimum period of a delinquency order, assuming that the applica-
tion is successful, is effectively three years. Section 162(11) serves to alleviate
the severity of a delinquency order. Arguably, that justifies the lack of discre-
tion for a court to determine a minimum period of delinquency.99
PRESCRIPTION PERIOD WITH REGARD TO THE JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION OF A DIRECTOR
Under section 162(5)(c) of the SA Companies Act, a court must make an order
declaring a person to be a delinquent director if the relevant offence set out in
the section was committed by the person “while a director”. It is submitted
that these words indicate that the application may be brought at any time
after the director committed the relevant offence, provided that the offence
was committed while the person was a director of the company. The only
96 Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483, para 56; Elliott v Australian
Securities and Investments Commission; Plymin v Australian Securities and Investments
Commission [2004] VSCA 54 (2004); Rich v ASIC, above at note 17, paras 48–50; ASIC v
Axis, above at note 23, paras 8–9.
97 See, for example: California Corporations Code, sec 304; Connecticut General Statutes,
sec 33-743(c); District of Columbia Code, sec 29-306.09(c); New York Business
Corporation Law, sec 706(d); Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, sec 1726(c);
Rhode Island Business Corporation Act, sec 7-1.2-805(d); and Washington Business
Corporation Act, sec 23B.08.090(2).
98 SA Companies Act, sec 162(11) and (12).
99 For a discussion of the application to suspend delinquency orders, see R Cassim “The sus-
pension and setting aside of delinquency and probation orders under the Companies
Act 71 of 2008” (2019) 22 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1.
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time limitation imposed in section 162 is that the person must have been a
director of the company within the 24 months immediately preceding the
delinquency application.100 Apart from this limitation, no prescription period
has been imposed with regard to the time period within which a delinquency
application must be instituted.101
The underlying policy of the legislature with regard to the imposition of a
24 month prescription period is not clear. If a director were to commit an
offence set out in section 162(5) and subsequently resign from the company
or be removed as a director, he or she would be immune from being declared
delinquent if the application were not lodged within 24 months after his or
her resignation or removal from the company. A further concern is that the
offence committed by the director may be discovered more than 24 months
after his or her departure from the company, in which event he or she
would be immune from being declared delinquent. This is because the 24
month time period starts to run as soon as the director ceases to be a director
of the company, not when the applicant becomes aware of the director’s mis-
conduct.102 It is not clear why the legislature saw fit to impose a prescription
period for an application of delinquency against a former director, but did not
impose a prescription period for an application of delinquency against a cur-
rent director.
In contrast, proceedings under the CDDA for the disqualification of an unfit
director of an insolvent company must be commenced within three years of
the date on which the company of which that person is or was a director
became insolvent.103 It is only with the leave of the court that an application
for the disqualification of an unfit director of an insolvent company may be
made more than three years after the company becomes insolvent.104 In
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies and Others,105 the UK Court of
Appeal stated that being a director represents a person’s means of livelihood
and his ability to carry on his business activities, and, if he has to defend pro-
ceedings that may disqualify him from being a director, he should know
100 SA Companies Act, sec 162(2), (3) and (4). See further Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission v Zwane (73548/2018) [2019] ZAGPPHC 381 (8 August 2019), para 24.
101 It is arguable that the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, which deals with the effect of the
effluxion of time on obligations, would not apply in this instance because it applies pri-
marily to the acquisition of ownership by prescription, the acquisition and extinction of
servitudes by prescription and the prescription of debts, while sec 162 of the SA
Companies Act relates to a declaration that affects a person’s status.
102 By way of comparison, prescription on a debt begins to run as soon as the debt is due,
but the debt is not regarded as being due until the creditor has knowledge of the iden-
tity of the debtor and the facts from which the debt arises: Prescription Act 68 of 1969,
sec 12(3). See further R Cassim “Delinquent directors under the Companies Act 71 of
2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic
Law Journal 1 at 15.
103 CDDA, sec 7(2).
104 Ibid.
105 [1996] 4 All ER 289 at 302.
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about this within a reasonable time instead of being left in a state of uncer-
tainty. The requirement to proceed timeously against miscreant directors is
imposed both to protect directors so that they may be able to organize their
affairs once the statutory time limit has passed free from the risk of future dis-
qualification,106 and to protect the public because it is “obviously wrong” in
the public interest that a person who is unfit to be a director should be left
free to be a director for any longer than is necessary.107 In considering
whether to grant leave to commence disqualification proceedings after the
statutory period had passed, a court must take into account the length of
the delay, the reasons for the delay, the strength of the case against the dir-
ector and the degree of prejudice caused to the director by the delay.108 In
Secretary of State v Davies,109 the UK Court of Appeal stated that the power to
extend the statutory period to apply for disqualification proceedings against
directors must be exercised sparingly and with great caution.
For the reasons propounded by the UK Court of Appeal, as discussed above,
it is submitted that a statutory time limit of three years should be imposed
with regard to delinquency applications under the SA Companies Act. It is fur-
ther submitted that the 24-month prescription period imposed for a director
who ceases to be a director of the company should be extended to three years.
In order to ensure that, in those instances where an application to declare a
director delinquent cannot be lodged within the three-year time period, it is
submitted that (as is the case under section 7(2) of the CDDA), an application
to declare a director delinquent after the three-year period should be possible
with the leave of the court. This would ensure that delinquent directors are
not immune from applications to declare them delinquent after three years,
but leave of the court should be sought to bring such an application after
three years. This would serve to balance the public interest with the director’s
legitimate interests. It is submitted that this would further be in accord with
the purposes of the SA Companies Act enshrined in sections 7(j) and 7(l)
respectively, of encouraging the efficient and responsible management of
companies, and of providing a predictable and effective environment for
the efficient regulation of companies.
DISCRETION OF THE COURT TO DISQUALIFY A DIRECTOR FROM
HOLDING OFFICE
If any of the grounds set out in section 162 of the SA Companies Act are satis-
fied, a court is obliged to make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent
106 Id at 297.
107 Ibid.
108 Re Probe Data Systems Ltd (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Desai [1992] BCC
110 at 118; Re Polly Peck International plc (In Administration) (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry v Ellis [1993] BCC 890 at 893–94; Secretary of State v Davies, above at note 105 at
296.
109 Id at 298.
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director, thereby disqualifying him or her from office. A South African court
has no discretion in this regard.110 In sharp contrast, under the CDDA,111 the
Australian Corporations Act,112 the MBCA113 and the corporate legislation of
the US states114 that permit the judicial removal of directors, courts have dis-
cretion whether or not to disqualify a director from holding office. In this
regard, section 162(5) of the SA Companies Act is stricter than the equivalent
provisions in the foreign jurisdictions reviewed here.
It may be argued that South African courts were denied this discretion in
the light of the seriousness of the offences listed in section 162(5). The lack
of discretion may arguably serve to promote consistency and certainty with
regard to declaring directors delinquent.115 Nevertheless, the absence of dis-
cretion has the effect that South African courts may not consider mitigating
factors in declaring directors delinquent. For instance, the courts are not
empowered to consider the remorse shown by the director, the need to bal-
ance the personal hardship to the director against the public interest, the
potential of the director to reform, or the likelihood of the director refraining
from any future misconduct in exercising his or her functions and duties.
INTERFERENCE BY THE JUDICIARY IN THE COMPANY’S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
While the judicial disqualification of directors is important and appropriate
in certain instances (such as when the shareholders or the board of directors
are unable to remove a director from office), in disqualifying directors from
holding office, the courts are in effect disregarding the results of the election
process by which the directors were elected by the shareholders or appointed
by the directors. Such action intrudes on the prerogative of shareholders to
elect directors and on the prerogative of the board to appoint directors to
office. The disqualification of directors by the judiciary thus impacts on the
110 This is made clear by the word “must” in sec 162(5). It should, however, be noted that,
with regard to the ground for delinquency in sec 162(5)(f) of the SA Companies Act (dir-
ector of a company that is convicted of an offence within a period of five years), which
may only be raised by an organ of state, a court has discretion to grant a declaration of
delinquency since the order will only be granted if “the court is satisfied that the declar-
ation of delinquency is justified”.
111 CDDA, secs 2, 3, 4, 5, 5A, 8 and 10. The only two instances when a disqualification order is
mandatory under the CDDA are under sec 6 relating to the disqualification of unfit
directors of insolvent companies and sec 9A relating to a competition disqualification
order.
112 See for instance sec 206C(1)(b).
113 MBCA, sec 8.09(a).
114 Refer for example to: DGCL, sec 225(c); California Corporations Code, sec 304;
Connecticut General Statutes, sec 33-743(a); Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law,
sec 1726(c); and Washington Business Corporation Act, sec 23B.08.090(1).
115 See S Griffin “The disqualification of unfit directors and the protection of the public
interest” (2002) 53/3 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 207 at 210.
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internal structure of the company and alters the composition of the body
elected by the board or by the shareholders to represent their interests.116
As a general principle, the courts are disinclined to interfere in the internal
operations of a company involving management decisions.117 The courts have
adopted the policy that they should not be involved in situations where the
parties are capable of resolving their disputes internally.118 The election, reten-
tion, dismissal or removal of officers, directors and employees are examples of
such internal corporate operations, which essentially involve management
decisions.119 However, section 162 of the SA Companies Act does not contain
provisions designed to minimize judicial interference in the company’s
internal affairs.
In contrast, the MBCA is designed to interfere as little as possible with the
company’s internal affairs. For instance, under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA,
not only has a court been given discretion to remove a director from office
based on a contravention of the grounds listed in that provision (which are
similar to the grounds set out in section 162(5)(c) of the SA Companies Act),
but it may do so only if, considering the director’s course of conduct and
the inadequacy of other available remedies, removal would be in the corpora-
tion’s best interests. It is noteworthy that section 8.09(a) of the MBCA states
that a court may remove a director from office or “may order other relief”.
Several US states permit a court to order other relief instead of removing a dir-
ector from office.120 Section 225(c) of the DGCL goes further in providing that
a court may remove a director from office if judicial removal is necessary to
avoid irreparable harm to the corporation. The corporate legislation of
some US states provides that a court may remove a director from office only
if removal is in the best interests of the corporation.121 These provisions
116 ON Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial removal of directors: Denial of directors’ license to steal
shareholders’ freedom to vote” (1999) 50 Hastings Law Journal 1 at 6.
117 Maynard v Office Appliances (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290 at 293; Kronenberg v Sullivan County
Steam Laundry Co 91 NYS 2d 144 (1949), para 8; Yende v Orlando Coal Distributors (Pty) Ltd
and Others 1961 (3) SA 314 (W); Breetveldt and Others v Van Zyl and Others 1972 (1) SA 304
(T); Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc Mass 353 NE 2d 657 (1976) at 662; Connolly v
Bain 484 NW 2d 207 (Iowa App 1992) at 211; Demoulas v Demoulas 1996 WL 511519
(Mass Super Ct Pct 1, 1996), para 32; Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd
2016 (5) SA 414 (GJ), para 59; CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another
2018 (3) SA 157 (GJ), para 81.
118 CDH Invest v Petrotank, id, para 80.
119 Wilkes v Springside, above at note 117 at 662; Connolly v Bain, above at note 117 at 211;
Demoulas v Demoulas, above at note 117, para 32.
120 See for example: Connecticut General Statutes, sec 33-743(a) and (d); District of Columbia
Code, sec 29-306.09(a)(2) and (d); and South Dakota Business Corporation Act, sec
47-1A-809.
121 See for example: Arizona Revised Statutes, sec 10-809(A)(2); Michigan Business
Corporation Act, sec 450.1514(1); South Carolina Code of Laws, sec 33-8-109(a); and
Washington Business Corporation Act, sec 23B.08.090(1).
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ensure that a court does not interfere unduly with a company’s internal
affairs.
In contrast, under section 162 of the SA Companies Act, a court is not
required to consider whether any other remedies are adequate before declar-
ing a director delinquent and hence disqualifying him or her from office. The
judicial disqualification of a director is not a remedy of last resort. A court is
also not required to consider whether declaring a director delinquent is in the
company’s best interests. Furthermore, a court is not given discretion to grant
other relief, save for making the declaration of delinquency subject to condi-
tions that it considers appropriate.122 From this it is clear that the SA
Companies Act adopts a stricter approach than the equivalent provisions in
the foreign jurisdictions considered above that have influenced it.
In Gihwala v Grancy,123 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the fact that
foreign legislation gives courts wider discretion to disqualify directors from
office does not render section 162(5)(c) of the SA Companies Act constitution-
ally problematic, and that the provision nonetheless remains rational. It
would have been instructive if the court had, in ascertaining the rationality
of section 162(5)(c), considered the equivalent provisions of the foreign juris-
dictions discussed above. It is submitted that the approach adopted to the
removal of a director under section 8.09 of the MBCA, the equivalent provi-
sions under the DGCL and the corporate legislation of the US states that per-
mit the judicial removal of a director, is commendable and has the effect of
limiting the extent of judicial interference in a company’s internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
Important lessons are to be gleaned from certain leading foreign jurisdictions
so as to ensure that the South African provisions on the judicial disqualifica-
tion of directors do not go too far in certain respects and that a proper balance
is maintained. As reinforced by section 5(2) of the SA Companies Act, it is sub-
mitted that shareholders should be permitted to institute delinquency pro-
ceedings by means of a derivative action, as this would have the advantage
of curbing abuse of section 162 of the SA Companies Act. A three-year statu-
tory time limit for applications to declare a director delinquent should be
imposed by section 162, and provision should be made for an application,
with the leave of the court, to be lodged to declare a director delinquent
after the three-year period has expired. South African courts should be
given discretion as to whether to declare directors delinquent. Moreover,
they should be required to consider whether the declaration of delinquency
and the consequent disqualification of the director would be in the com-
pany’s best interests. In addition, they should have the power to consider
the adequacy of any remedies other than a declaration of delinquency.
122 SA Companies Act, sec 162(6).
123 Above at note 16, para 145.
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While the core of the regime set out in section 162 of the SA Companies Act
is to hold directors accountable, section 7(i) of the act at the same time
requires a balance to be maintained between the rights and obligations of
shareholders and directors within companies. It is submitted that the recom-
mendations above would do much to maintain this balance and would more-
over promote the development of the South African economy by encouraging
entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency, encouraging the efficient and
responsible management of companies, and providing a predictable and
effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies, as required
by section 7 of the SA Companies Act. Declaring a director delinquent is a
severe remedy, with a penal element and harsh consequences. It must not
be applied without due and proper consideration by a court. As the UK
Court of Appeal emphasized in Secretary of State v Davies,124 to be a director




124 Above at note 105 at 302.
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